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Implementing a Side Channel Attack on a Linux system to steal sensory data

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Memory Flow

To date, no operating system is able to track the behavior of the any signal* and determine precisely whether it is ordinary or called in order to steal confidential information. This project implements an attack on this vulnerability. Under the signal*, I define any action that has several states. For example:

  1. an open and closed socket
  2. a working and a non-working process
  3. a created and deleted file, a mounted and unmounted partition, and so on.

The purpose of the attack is confidential information
The initiator of the attack is a user who has fairly high rights in the system
The essence of the attack is to quietly lower the file’s access rights by means of signal* transmission.

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Implementing a Side Channel Attack on a Linux system to steal sensory data

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